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A B S T R A C T 
The purpose of the paper is to investigate the extent to which present-day design of 
steel framed buildings is susceptible to total collapse when subjected to extreme fire 
events. We select a 50 storey structure in which 2 and 4 adjacent storeys located at 
different above-ground heights are, in separate scenarios engulfed in raging fires. A 
total of 8 scenarios are analyzed, employing Newtonian mechanics and realistic en-
ergy dissipating properties of H-shaped columns and normal concrete floor slabs 
possessing secondary (shrinkage and temperature) reinforcement alone. While the 
present Canadian building code is the basis for our column designs, other standards 
provide very similar specifications. Although fire proofing is required in virtually all 
high rise building construction, we are excluding such materials in order to simplify 
the analyses, but clearly do not advocate its omission – quite the opposite in fact. As 
well, attributes such as floor beams, partitions and furnishings of every description, 
all of which would in practice participate in absorbing the kinetic energy of a crush-
down upper block are excluded. Despite such a vast array of conservative assump-
tions, it is shown that partial collapse may occur during crush-down, however, in no 
case will total collapse be the consequence. These results should provide some com-
fort to code writers that their requirements should indeed prevent the most cata-
strophic of failures due to fires. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior to the horrendous events of 9/11 that resulted 
in thousands of deaths and the total destruction of three 
high rise steel framed buildings in the World Trade Cen-
ter complex in New York City, the issue of fires being the 
cause of collapse of such structures was ignored for good 
reason. An excellent earlier history of fire safety inferred 
that existing fire protection of the supporting structure 
together with life safety systems were indeed sufficient. 
Even the authors of the FEMA 403 report (2002) con-
cluded that no significant changes were warranted in 
building codes and design practice. The circumstances of 
that day in 2001 were deemed to be an extraordinary 
combination of extreme events that could not have been 
anticipated. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, is the huge number of fire 
events that occur in high rise buildings every year that 
are generally unreported because of the rarity of associ-
ated collapse events. For example, John Hall Jr. has pub-
lished reports for the National Fire Protection Associa-
tion in the U.S. (2001, 2013) that provide statistics show-
ing, on average, 10,000 significant fires having occurred 
annually in buildings 7 storeys or more in periods 1985-
1998 and 2007-2011 respectively, with occupancy clas-
sifications being: apartments, hotels and motels, hospi-
tals and care facilities, and offices. Although the latter 5 
year period reveals somewhat fewer fire events than the 
earlier study, that data, together with the events of 9/11 
have inspired the structural engineering profession to 
devote greater efforts to reduce the risks of fire, civilian 
deaths and injuries and property damage. In that regard, 
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a very comprehensive, but difficult to verify computer 
model known as the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 
which purportedly “gave good agreement with the fire 
spread as observed at the windows” of WTC 1 and 2 
(McAllister et al., 2013), but when later improvements 
were made to FDS, attempts to confirm its validation for 
reconstructing the magnitude of the WTC fires was de-
scribed as weak (Quintiere and Williams, 2014). 
Engineers and scientists who have a rudimentary 
knowledge of structural design and thermal properties 
of materials should not be expected to accept on faith the 
results of computer analyses, especially when they are at 
odds with historical data, as were the circumstances in-
volving the demise of the WTC towers. In an earlier pa-
per on the collapse of WTC7 (Korol et al.,2015), we un-
dertook a fire analysis that accounted for fire loadings 
and temperature-time plots to ascertain if that structure 
could have succumbed by fire alone. However, in this ar-
ticle, our purpose is to undertake a simplified analysis 
that accepts worst case conditions on a generic steel 
framed 50 storey office building weakened by fire load-
ings, employing conventional principles of engineering 
design and Newton’s laws, and to which gravity loads are 
applied. In this regard, a series of 8 scenarios will be ex-
amined involving adjacent 2 and 4 storey fires at levels 
ranging in 10 storey increments from top to bottom - the 
objective being to assess the extent to which partial or 
total collapse would be the result. 
 
2. Description of the Postulated Structure 
We begin by assuming a rectangular-shaped 50 storey 
hi-rise office building, having equal storey heights of 4m 
for which non-core areas (our focus) occupy an area of 
3,920 m2. For purposes of simplicity, we assume a regu-
lar grid consisting or 80 equal sized columns in a given 
storey, a segment of which is noted in Fig. 1, with tribu-
tary areas of 49 m2 and sizes commensurate with gravity 
loading based on load and resistance factors consistent 
with the most recent design code for steel structures 
used in Canada (CSA, 2014). It’s assumed that W-shapes 
are employed for the columns with size changes occur-
ring in three storey segments. A commonly-used series 
in such applications is W360 which has a wide range of 
weights and dimensions compatible as columns in com-
pression load transfer, with upper column footprints 
contained within the cross section profiles consistent 
with those below. This form of column stacking provides 
for simplified and cost efficient detailing for which splice 
and filler plates alone are needed for full moment and 
shear transfer compatibility. 
It will be assumed that the steel is construction grade, 
having a nominal yield stress value, Fy of 345 MPa, which 
will be reduced to a value defined as Fy* to account for 
compressive loading of slender elements in compression 
(flanges and web) in accordance with the Canadian de-
sign code mentioned earlier. As well, there is the matter 
of selecting column sizes to minimize fabrication costs 
(i.e. choosing sections that are continuous for 3 storeys). 
For Scenario 1, we assume a constant size for columns 
occupying the uppermost storeys for which fires will 
rage, i.e. the 40th and 41st levels. A design computation 
for sizing these columns must therefore be based on pre-
scribed loadings on various floors, for which we chose 
the 40th for our example that also must take into account 
column slenderness. A detailed computation for this case 
is presented in Appendix A. 
 
Fig. 1. Non-core column arrangement. 
Meanwhile, the floors at all levels and the factored 
gravity loading appropriate at that level are presumed to 
consist of normal strength concrete having an average 
thickness of 102 mm (4”) and containing wire mesh, os-
tensibly cast onto ribbed steel deck, meant to resist 
shrinkage and temperature cracks. Although the floors 
will obviously require floor beams and girders to sup-
port floor loadings, our analysis will ignore the twisting 
and bending energy absorbed during a potential global 
collapse event. In this way, we are assured that actual 
collapse states will be less severe than what we predict 
from our analysis.  
 
3. Assumptions Associated with Collapse Initiation 
In the design of any structure, a reasonable margin of 
safety is needed that accounts both for unanticipated 
overload conditions, and a possible strength deficiency 
of the material below its nominal value. In general, a high 
overload value, generally above 3 is the norm when lat-
eral loads from winds and earthquake are present. 
However, for our case, we will assume that the core of 
the structure will contain the elevator shaft, stairwells 
and mechanical rooms with a reinforced concrete perim-
eter wall which, together with robust steel columns pro-
vides the structural system needed to resist lateral load-
ing. In the non-core area therefore, we assume that re-
sistance to gravity loading alone controls the design of 
the columns based on limit states. The safety factor then 
represents a ratio of the factored gravity loads divided 
by realistic load values existing under the situation of a 
fire event. The resistance factor for the columns, there-
fore, is based on both the nominal steel strength and an 
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effective length factor for equally loaded columns at 
given floor levels. Even discounting the bending re-
straint provided by floor beams and girders, a factor of 
safety of approximately 2 is provided based on industry 
standards and noted by Wikipedia which states “Design 
factors for specific applications are often mandated by 
law, policy, or industry standards. Buildings commonly 
use a factor of safety of 2.0 for each structural member. 
The value for buildings is relatively low because the 
loads are well understood and most structures are re-
dundant.” General details are noted under “Wikipedia” in 
our References section. A further breakdown of loads 
and resistance information is presented in Appendix A 
for the case described as Scenario 1. As noted, fires rag-
ing throughout a given storey will reduce column 
strength equally to all columns, but for computational 
purposes, the equivalent of 39 of the 80 columns fail to-
tally, thus offering no further resistance. Consequently, 
we make the assumption that 41 remain with full load ca-
pacity and which will offer resistance at the instant that 
collapse of the upper block is initiated. This value repre-
sents an average, since column sizes are limited and can 
only provide approximate factors of safety for given sto-
reys. Overall, however, this number is on the conserva-
tive side in virtually all design situations and as such is 
the value which we shall ascribe to our design example. 
Such a value will be presumed to mean that the equiv-
alent of slightly more than 50% of the columns in a sto-
rey that is fully ablaze are able to resist the loads above 
it until progressive collapse begins. When one more col-
umn succumbs, those remaining will be deemed to no 
longer withstand the loading above, and will fail with 
post-bucking resistance offered by the 41 unscathed col-
umns, and act to slow down the motion of the block of 
storeys above. However, their post-buckling resistance 
will be shown to be insufficient in preventing crush-
down onto the floor below. 
Fig. 2 shows a profile view of such a structure depict-
ing four scenarios in one sketch. Scenario 1 is indicative 
of fires in storeys 41 and 40 while the rest of the building 
is free from fires of any kind. Scenario 2, illustrates a case 
where the fires are only occurring in storeys 31 and 30, 
etc. to Scenario 4, in which fires exist only in storeys 11 
and 10.
 
Fig. 2. Scenarios from 1 to 4 (raging fires on each of 2 storeys).
4. Dissipative Elements Resisting Collapse 
In considering the columns which are deemed to be 
the major contributors to resisting storey-to-storey 
gravity loads, we assume therefore that 41 columns 
within a given storey are totally capable of providing 
post-buckling resistance to axial loads as opposed to the 
other 39 which are assumed to have been completely 
compromised by the fires raging in the storeys noted (i.e. 
41 and 40 as noted in Fig. 2(a) for Scenario 1). An issue to 
be resolved is what value of axial resistance is appropriate 
when a column fails, but retains post buckling strength 
resistance. Bazant and Zhou (2002) chose to employ 
only bending resistance together with rotation capacity 
as being the measure of such energy absorption. As 
noted in an earlier paper (Korol and Sivakumaran, 
2014), the vast majority of columns such as those em-
ployed in office buildings offer much greater energy dis-
sipative values under axial loads than values computed 
employing standard plastic hinges under lateral loads 
only. Based on a set of experiments undertaken at 
McMaster University, axial energy dissipation in the 
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post-bucking range needs to be included. We do so indi-
rectly by employing a factor defined as α, which is used 
to multiply the Plastic Bending energy part alone to ac-
count for both types of resistance. Indeed, our experi-
ments on the equivalent of pin-end-ended columns 
showed values of α to be about 3.5 times the value ob-
tained when that same member is subjected to a lateral 
load causing minor axis plastic bending alone. 
We assume for storeys experiencing raging fires that 
the concrete in their floor areas offer no resistance 
through pulverization because of having experienced in-
tense heat. However, other floors that have not been ex-
posed to the fires are presumed to be resistant to break-
up during the assorted impacts that will occur as storeys 
crush down onto lower levels. In this regard, our earlier 
work on the energy required to pulverize concrete slabs 
that contains shrinkage steel suggest that penetration 
loadings from beams and girders crashing onto them, 
will be resisted in accordance with the degree of pulver-
ization, i.e. the extent to which floors are broken up into 
both very small and large sized particles through pene-
tration loadings. An earlier paper (Sivakumaran et al., 
2014) reported on our experimental findings involving 
concrete slabs with shrinkage reinforcement only, and 
arrived at an estimate of 4900 J/kg as an average value 
for the break-up under penetration loadings. We will use 
this figure for normal strength concrete having a density 
of 2400 kg/m3, together with an average depth of floor 
slab of 101.4 mm (4”). 
5. Fire Condition Scenarios 
5.1. Scenario 1 
Being very conservative in estimating resistances of-
fered in storeys experiencing raging fires, we ignore any 
dissipative energy the presumed concrete floors would 
normally offer. Consequently, the only resistance as-
sumed to contribute towards energy dissipation by steel 
members will involve 41 columns i.e. these being almost 
sufficient to support the loading above the storeys that 
are on fire, and noted as mass M42 in Fig. 2 for Scenario 
1. Since the initial energy state has zero velocity the fol-
lowing equation therefore applies to this case: 
½(𝑀42) (𝑣41
𝑓
)2 = 𝑀42 𝑔 ℎ − 41 ∙ 0.9𝜋 𝑍𝑦 𝐹𝑦
∗ 𝛼 , (1) 
in which 𝑣41
𝑓
 is the final velocity of the upper block at im-
pact with the 41st floor and Zy is the plastic section mod-
ulus for bending about the section’s minor axis (CISC 
handbook, 2016). Note that we have assumed that plas-
tic hinges form only at the mid-height of storeys, and do 
not form at floor levels, again under-estimating column 
absorptive energy capacity in the interest of being con-
servative. The 0.9π factor is an estimate of the angle ro-
tated at mid- height as a given column is crushed, before 
encountering a floor’s crushed debris. Inserting the val-
ues noted in row 1 of Table 1, together with h = 4m gives 
the result of 𝑣41
𝑓
 = 7.71 m/sec.
Table 1. Column and total mass data for pertinent storeys. 
Storey i W-Shape 𝑍𝑦 (mm3) 𝐹𝑦
∗ (MPa) ∑ 𝑖51(𝑚𝑖 + 𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑠) ∙ 10
3  kg = 𝑀𝑖+1 
41 W360 x 162 1520 299.9 19483 
40 “ “ “ 21553 
39 W360 x 179 1680 302.2 23529 
38 “ “ “ 25505 
37 “ “ “ 27480 
31 W360 x 262 2680 305.2 39072 
30 W360 x 287 2960 306.2 41082 
29 “ “ “ 43091 
28 “ “ “ 45096 
27 W360 x 314 3240 306.3 47120 
21 W360 x 382 4030 308.0 58750 
20 “ “ “ 60790 
19 “ “ “ 62790 
18 W360 x 421 4490 310.4 64883 
17 “ “ “ 66936 
16 “ “ “ 68985 
15 W369 x 463 4980 310.8 70989 
11 W360 x 509 5550 311.6 78742 
10 “ “ “ 80823 
9 W360 x 551 6050 312.0 82918 
8 “ “ “ 85072 
7 “ “ “ 87106 
6 W360 x 592 6570 312.2 89214 
5 “ “ “ 91321 
4 “ “ “ 93428 
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Continuing with the analysis in the 40th storey, we em-
ploy the conservation of momentum principle to ascer-
tain the initial velocity of the block crushing down into 
the 40th storey and which gives a value of 𝑣40
𝑖  equal to 
10/11 times 7.71 to give the initial velocity of 7.01 
m/sec. in the 40th storey. The equation of motion then 
becomes: 
½(𝑀41)(𝑣40
𝑓 )
2
= 
 ½(𝑀41) (7.01)
2 + (𝑀41) 𝑔 ℎ – 41 ∙ 0.9𝜋 𝑍𝑦 𝐹𝑦
∗ 𝛼 . (2) 
Employing the values noted in the second row of Ta-
ble 1 results in a value of 𝑣40
𝑓
 of 10.51 m/sec, followed by 
a reduced value of 𝑣39
𝑖  of 9.63 m/sec. We are now dealing 
with a storey that has not experienced fires during this 
scenario and hence we need to account for all 80 col-
umns and, if they are insufficient to stop the motion, pul-
verization of the 39th floor comes into play. The govern-
ing equations for such a case is: 
(𝑣39
𝑓
)2 = (𝑣39
𝑖 )2 + 2𝑔ℎ –
2[80∙0.9𝜋 𝑍𝑦 𝐹𝑦
∗ 𝛼 – 𝑋 (4.674 ∙ 109)]
𝑀40
 . (3) 
The numerator of the last term in Eq. (3) is the en-
ergy absorbed by concrete floor pulverization. Total 
floor destruction is indicated by X = 1, in which case the 
final velocity within that storey > 0 with motion contin-
uing into the storey below, whereas a negative value of 
𝑣𝑓 would indicate that the motion stops with only part 
of the floor area energy dissipation needed by that 
floor’s breakup. In our case, setting 𝑣39
𝑓
 = 0, and solving 
for X results in a value of 0.34 means that 34% of that 
floor is pulverized. We conclude, therefore, that the mo-
tion stops at the 39th floor. This result is given in the 
first row of Table 2. 
5.2. Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 
Similar calculations were performed for the other 
three scenarios that involved 2 storey fires. The pertinent 
data for Scenario 2 involved storeys 31, 30 and 29 in Table 
1, while row 2 of Table 2 noted that motion stopped at the 
floor of storey 29, this time with 70% of the floor broken 
up. In the case of Scenario 3, it will be noted in Table 2 
that crush-down extended an extra storey to level 18, 
with 38% pulverization, while Scenario 4 resulted in the 
most severe damage state with 4 storeys crushed and 
77% of floor 8 suffering breakup. It is evident therefore 
that raging fires occurring at low rather than high levels 
in a building will result in a partial collapse that involves 
the greatest amount of damage to the structure. 
5.3. Scenario 5 
It is of interest to determine the extent to which a 
greater degree of structural damage occurs when 4 sto-
reys are engulfed in fires. Such might be the case for cir-
cumstances when a building is struck by a jumbo-jet air-
craft, for example, as we witnessed in New York City some 
years ago. In this particular scenario, fires are presumed 
to rage in storeys 41, 40, 39 and 38, and is shown in Fig. 3. 
For this Scenario, we will have equations similar to those 
noted for Scenario 1, but which require us to employ the 
data and do calculations for two additional levels involv-
ing stories 38 and 37. Employing Newton’s laws of conser-
vation of energy and the linear momentum principle as 
before, and with data obtained from Table 1, we deter-
mine that crush-down will destroy 5 storeys and result in 
64% of the floor in storey 37 having been compromised 
before the motion stops. This means that about twice as 
much of the floor below the fire is subject to breakup as 
compared with Scenario 1 that involved two storey fires.
 
Fig. 3. Scenarios from 5 to 8 (raging fires on each of 4 storeys). 
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Table 2. Results of storey fires and computed states of collapse  
(based on steel yield stress = 345 MPa and S.F. = 2). 
Scenario Fires in storeys Storeys crushed Motion stopped in floor Pulverization when motion stops 
1 41,40 41, 40, 39 39 34% 
2 31,30 31, 30, 29 29 70% 
3 21,20 21,20,19, 18 18 38% 
4 11,10 11, 10, 9, 8 8 77% 
     
5 41, 40, 39, 38 41, 40 39, 38, 37 37 64% 
6 31, 30, 29, 28 31, 30, 29, 28, 27, 26 26 46% 
7 21, 20, 19, 18 21, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15 15 49% 
8 11, 10, 9, 8 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5,4 4 63% 
5.4. Scenarios 6, 7 and 8 
These last three scenarios involve 4 storey fires at 
progressively lower levels akin to scenarios 2, 3 and 4. 
As observed from the last three rows of Table 2, an addi-
tional one or two storeys crush down occurs when com-
pared to their scenario counterparts, 2, 3 and 4. Fig. 3 
shows the storeys that are pertinent, i.e. 31, 30, 29 and 
28 for Scenario 6, and so on, with our highlighting the 
last one as “d) Scenario 8”. It represents the worst case 
in terms of damage to the structure since there are four 
additional storeys, 7, 6, 5 and 4 that crush down with the 
latter floor’s area being pulverized by 63% before the 
motion stops.  
 
6. Conclusions 
As we noted in the Introduction, even the authors of 
the FEMA report pertaining to the collapse of the twin 
towers, purportedly due to fires primarily, did not ad-
vance a need for major changes to the applicable build-
ing codes at that time (FEMA, 2002). However, others, 
such as Bazant and Zhou (2002), Bazant and Le (2011) 
and NIST (2005, 2011) indicate otherwise. Our objective 
in this article has been to employ the present day build-
ing code that is applicable to high rise buildings and ar-
rive at column sizes that meet the requirements of the 
CSA Standard (CAN/CSA S16-14) for non-core areas. 
These areas are less robust than are core areas, and 
hence represent a greater potential risk of collapse 
due to gravity driven loadings when extreme fire loads 
are present than would the overall structure experi-
ence.  
Our focus has been to utilize principles that are easily 
understood, i.e. Newton’s laws and employ assumptions 
commensurate with energy absorption elements that in-
clude plastic hinge buckling at mid height storeys that 
are subject to progressive collapse, and to concrete floor 
slabs that will breakup when struck by falling steel floor 
beams and girders. In the interest of being conservative, 
we have excluded any twisting and bending of these floor 
support members, the fasteners that yield and/or frac-
ture, the arrays of non-structural partitions, desks, book-
cases, filing cabinets etc. that are present in occupied of-
fice spaces. 
 Despite our neglecting so many such crush resisting 
components, we found that for cases where fires raged 
on two adjacent floors (4 scenarios including top, bottom 
and intermediate cases) that the one giving rise to a max-
imum amount of structural damage was Scenario 4. Fires 
in storeys 10 and 11 resulted in collapse of 2 storeys be-
low, i.e. 9 and 8. For storey 8, the motion of the upper 
block stopped when 77% of a floor broke up. 
When four adjacent floors experience extremely hot 
fires, crush-down failures do cause more than two sto-
reys below to fail. In the case of Scenario 8 that involved 
fires on floors 8 to 11 inclusive, storeys 7 down to 4 suf-
fered collapse, with the motion stopping with 63% of the 
4th floor subject to breakup. 
Since complete collapse in crush-down for even the 
most severe case of fires on four adjacent floors con-
ceived in our study did not happen, we have to conclude 
that fire events of any reasonable description will not 
cause a steel framed building to collapse – partial col-
lapse of some storeys? Yes, unfortunately, but overall 
collapse? No.  
In that regard, code writers might wish to caution 
owners of high rise buildings that occupants ought to be 
warned about the possibility, slight as it might be, of 
some floors immediately below those experiencing rag-
ing fires to collapse, but not to panic. Storeys distant 
from those so engulfed would likely provide a temporary 
safe haven. Of course, smoke inhalation is another issue 
that such standards might need to embrace. Clearly, 
other means of protection which were beyond our study 
such as proper exits, sprinkler systems, alarms etc. are 
vitally important in saving lives. 
 
Appendix A. Design Parameters Associated with Sce-
nario 1 
The following subsections provide the basis for the 
design of the columns in storeys 40 and 41. 
 
a) For design purposes we must select what are known 
as specified values for L and D which for office buildings 
the values prescribed are taken as 2.4 kPa and 3.6 kPa 
respectively for floors. Employing load factors of 1.5 for 
L and 1.25 for D that include roof loadings assumed to be 
equivalent to that for a typical floor, and, estimating the 
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self weight of columns above the 40th (10 levels), we get 
a factored load of 80 [8.1 x 49 x 11 x 103 + 105 x 4 x 10 x 
9.81] = 353 x 106 N. Meanwhile the factored resistance 
for a single column of size W360x162 is computed to be 
5560 kN for an unsupported length of 4m, the computa-
tion of which is given in Appendix 2. It follows, then, that 
for 80 columns prior to the fires the factored resistance 
is 5560 x 80 x 103 = 444.8 x 106 N, or about 26% higher 
than the factored load. (Had we selected a lighter section, 
it would have required filler plates to accommodate 
depth dimension discrepancy with the 360W179 section 
selected immediately below). The top two rows of Table 
1 indicate the W-shape selected and the Zy and Fy* asso-
ciated with the storeys that relate to the fire events per-
taining to Scenario 1.  
 
b) The computation of mass M1 (block above storey 41) 
arising from expected live and dead loads during a fire, 
or in general, normal occupancy, involves prescribing a 
value lower than that proposed for the design. As such, 
we select 0.5 L, for the former, with dead loading equal 
to that specified, i.e. D in storeys 42 to the roof inclusive, 
i.e a total of 10 levels. We then calculate a value of load 
applied that when converted to mass units, works out to 
be 19,180 x 103 kg. Accounting for the self weight of the 
columns for 9 levels, gives an adjusted total tally of 
19,483 x 103 kg (i.e. an average of 105 kg/m) and noted 
in the top row of Table 1. The 40th storey will, of course 
be subject to an additional level of loading for which the 
tally becomes 21,553 x 103 kg, noted in the second row. 
As pointed out previously, an adequate factor of safety (of 
about 2), results in our selecting an H-shape designated 
as 360W162 for these two levels, with a computed re-
sistance in mass units of (5560 x 80 x 103)/9.81 = 45,340 
x 103 kg, a value which is 2.1 times that of the expected 
applied loading. This size is reasonable for gravity forces 
only, since the core areas are deemed to provide much of 
the lateral resistance to withstand anticipated maximum 
wind or earthquake loads. However, it should be noted 
that expansion of structural members due to tempera-
ture effects which can result in additional stresses due to 
restraining forces from floor systems will have unspeci-
fied consequences in reducing the factor of safety to a 
minor extent, perhaps lowering it to just under 2. 
 
Appendix B. Factored Resistance of Columns (Storey 
40 & 41) 
While Fy is presumed to be 345 MPa, a reduction fac-
tor is required to account a column’s effective length and 
radius of gyration values. The formula that is applicable 
by the Canadian code is based on the parameter λ = KL/r 
(Fy/𝜋2E)1/2 in which KL = 4000 mm, rmin = ry = 95 mm, 
and E = 200,000 MPa. For a W360x162 section, λ = 0.557. 
The empirical factor, which the code adopted is com-
puted as [1+0.5572.68]-0.7463 = 0.8685, that when multi-
plied by Fy gives the value of Fy*, or 299.6 MPa, as noted 
in Table 1.  
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